Gal and Kligman offer an engaging and clear review of the state of current research on gender in post-socialist countries. They focus on theoretical themes that point the way towards future research in both post-socialist countries and elsewhere. Their analysis is specific enough to give a good feel for the situation in Eastern Europe and Russia and be of interest to students and specialists of the area. However, the thematic analysis is broad enough to be of great use to anyone interested in gender. I highly recommend it.

An updated version of the book is now available. It contains photographs of Cape Town taken in late 1998. I live in Cape Town and I was impressed by the quality and beauty of the photographs in this book. I fell in love with Cape Town all over again. Worth looking at if you have any doubts of visiting this city.

This is an execellant work that details from difficult and choatic historical sources the history of the development of the Roman Praetor. This powerful position that developed during the Roman Republic set the stage for the expansion of the later Empire. Brennan has done a masterful job at presenting the often confusing information on the subject into a dense but very understandable form. His analysis is thurough and much needed in an area of research that has not been well developed. For anyone who is interested in Roman history, the history of modern political institutions or the development of administrative power in an ancient nation, this is your book.

This Insight Cityguide volume, printed in Singapore, is of glossy hard-stock paper. Each page has either a full-color photograph, or a full-color photo with text. This is more of a fabulous picture book, than a Fodor's-type guidebook. As such, it is mostly timeless as opposed to up-to-the-minute guidebooks that quickly become obsolete. The back cover states, "With imaginative text and dazzling photography, this book captures the essence of what has been called the Golden City, the Jewel in the Bohemian Crown, and the City of a Hundred Spires. The Prague of Charles IV is also the Prague of Rudolf II and Franz Kafka, of Alexander Dubcek and Vaclav Havel. This book traces the tempestuous history behind the beautiful facades. Every aspect of the city is explored in detail: Wenceslas Square, the Hradcany Castle, the Old and New Towns, the former Prague Ghetto, the banks of the Vltava, and the Royal Way. Here are Prague's top cultural experiences, from its world-class concerts to its superb galleries, and information revealing where to find the best pubs, coffee houses and entertainments. This Insight Cityguide provides what its title promises: a true insight into what makes the people of Prague tick. We learn what they think of their city and hear their hopes for the future." Should you buy this book? It is a visual guide to Prague, with really beautiful photography - great for those who are going, and who just want to go.

Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media In War And Peace by Kemal Kurspahic offers a compelling tale of power, control, threat, and the outnumbered few who fought to preserve their journalistic integrity during the bloody Balkan conflicts. Closely examining Slobodan Milosevic's stranglehold on the media and his callous use of it to churn out favorable propaganda for his murderous and genocidal expansionism, Prime Time Crime is a combination of modern history and real-life cautionary tale, which is especially recommended reading for students of Journalism, Contemporary European Studies, and Post-Cold War Yugoslavian History.

.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, with an overview of the history of the DR before this and up to recent times.

The author portrays a very fascinating brief experiment in American government support of politicians in the Third World who were mild social democrats. The Dominican exile Juan Bosch and his social democratic party the PRD received a great deal of CIA support from 1959-62. The U.S. had decided to withdraw its support from the barbarian dictator Rafael Trujillo who had been in power since 1930, having risen to the leadership of the Dominian army during the very brutal U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic of 1916-24. They could not gain any sort of support whatever in the hemisphere against Castro if they continued to support Trujillo.

The U.S. tried its best without disrupting the power of the military or the landed oligarchy to get rid of Trujilloism in the DR, particulary after Trujillo was finally assasinated at the end of May 1961. Bosch assumed power in February 1963 and spent most of his time trying not to upset the military. It was no use. Bosch granted considerable freedom for unions to organize. Thus, for instance the U.S. owned La Romana sugar referinery, the largest in the DR, was forced to to grant a 30 percent increase in wages. He also made lofty plans to redistribute to the poor the vast estates held formerly by Trujillo and his associates but only redistributed them to about 600 families. He made the mistake of telling the U.S. ambassador John B. Martin that he planned to place limits on land ownership and redistribute land held over the limit to the poor and also place a twenty percent tax on the large landholders. Martin denounced this plan and Bosch withdrew it but it was one more sign to U.S. policy makers that Bosch was very unreliable. The Dominican military finally overthrew him in late September 1963, just eight months into his term. This coup had tacit U.S. support.

The new military junta proceeded to set loose death squads on the opposition and the U.S. was quite fine with this. Now we come to April 1965 and the main focus of this book. Late in that month military officers calling themselves the constitutionalists launced a rebellion with the stated aim of restoring Bosch to power. The U.S. then invaded a few days later for the purpose of preventing this rebellion which was just about to succeed in taking over the country. Chester goes over laboriously U.S. actions over the next few months. The first stated reason for the intervention was to protect U.S. and other foreign nationals caught up in the fighting. Thomas notes that the U.S. had already been conducting an airlift of foreigners out of the country without an invasion and that this process could have handled the 2000 or so who remained to be evacuated. There is no evidence that these people were actually under any danger. After this excuse lost whatever power it had, there was the old communist card. LBJ believed at first that the rebellion was a plot cordinated by the Soviet Union but then he came to realize along with his more liberal cabinet members that it was a true homegrown revolution. The pro-Soviet and Maoist parties were miniscule particpants in the rebellion. The de facto leader of the rebellion Francisco Caamano was an officer who had supported Bosch's overthrow but had been disgusted by the corruption of the military junta which replaced it. His father had been a general who had led Trujillo's massacre of twenty thousand Hatian migrant workers in 1937. U.S. leaders tried desperately to find evidence of his connection to communisism.

The U.S. tried other excuses like that their intervention was "peacekeeping" to prevent a huge bloodbath. LBJ cynically cited the 1500 deaths in the slums of Santo Domingo as a rationale for intervening. Chester notes that indeed 1500 people were killed but by the U.S. backed Dominican military whose planes were supplied with fuel by the U.S. and who were being violently urged on by U.S. military commanders.

The U.S. used this occasion to set up a cordon, an "international security zone" that effectively divided the rebels of Northern Santo Domingo from those in the inner city. They provoked several battles with the rebels and allowed passage of the Junta's troops and supplies through its cordon all the while proclaiming that they were neutral between the two sides.

Well, the U.S. managed after several tries managed to set up a provisional government largely excluding any sort of liberals or leftists. The U.S. had continually been sending negotiators to Bosch in his Puerto Rican exile to relentlessly badger him into agreeing to U.S. demands. The U.S. was deeply disturbed that Bosch and his PRD would only agree to monitor communists and other forces that the U.S. defined as part of the "radical left" and only arrest them if they actually broke the law.

An election was held in June 1966 between Joaquin Balaguer, a former of Trujillo, and Bosch. Bosch supporters were subjected to massive terror in the countryside away scrutiny in the year before the election. The number of voters had shown an implausible thirty percent increase since the 1962 election. Balaguer insisted that the rules be changed so that women over twenty five did not have to show any identification while voting, ensuring that, older women, his base of support could could vote many times. And there was ballot stuffing on a grand scale.

The activities of Norman Thomas and Sacha Vollman as portrayed in this book are certainly interesting.

The author writes that inn the first decade or so of Balaguer's rule, the DR became an "economic miracle" as unions were crushed, dissidents killed by the thousands and multinational corporations flocked to the slave labor in the special "enterprise zones". U.S. military and economic aid dramatically increased. Ten percent of the population would leave the country between 1966 and 1990 too seek a better life..

Michael Urban, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997 + 429 pages. Notes and references. Select bibliography. Index.

Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC

Michael Urban's book, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia contains such a wealth of important ideas that a reviewer is challenged to summarize them adequately in a mere 750 words. This excellent book deals with contemporary Russian politics from 1989 to the present, seeking in particular "to explain the rebirth of politics amid the collapse of the USSR." It lends great insight into the question of why the "democratic experiment" in Russia has not been more successful thus far. The book starts with a model of "politics," in which the authors attempt to "articulate the concept across three spheres (state, political society, and civil society) and along two dimensions (organization and communication)." In this reviewer's opinion, this first chapter is rather dry and abstruse. The remaining chapters, however, are more concrete and interesting. Chapter two turns to the so-called "pre-political period," i.e. the period before the appearance of the Gorbachev-era "informals" and the formation (in 1990) of bona fide political parties. It describes the various strategies employed by the dissident movement---launched in about 1965 with the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel--to gain political influence, These included stressing legality and using the Soviet Constitution as a weapon against the communist authorities; organizing demonstrations; appealing to the West regarding human rights violations; and documenting such abuses in publications such as the Chronicle of Current Events. The authors claim that the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s had two major weaknesses. The first was their failure to address the Russian people directly, instead focusing primarily on the communist authorities. This hindered their ability to build grassroots support. The second shortcoming--which continues to inhibit the pro-reform political parties in Russia today--was the dissidents' "abstemious attitude" toward politics and unwillingness to cooperate with the party-state. These dissident intellectuals preferred to philosophize than to compromise their ideals in the nitty-gritty organizational work. Chapters three, four, and five examine Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glasnost and the resulting mushrooming of informal organizations (neformaly). Here the authors point to an interesting paradox. Very few dissidents from the pre-political period participated in the informals, despite the fact that many of Gorbachev's ideas emerged from dissident "samizdat" publications or even official but liberal publications from the 1960s (like Novy Mir). This can be explained in part by the dissidents' traditional "abstemious attitude" toward politics mentioned above. In addition, as the authors note perceptively, after decades of basing their identity in opposition to the party-state system, the older dissidents either refused or hesitated to work within that system, in the officially sanctioned informals. Chapter six discusses the positive and negative aspects of the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. Candidates fielded by the informal groups faced tremendous difficulties, from finding a public hall in which to hold the nominating sessions, making themselves heard above the jeers of communist hecklers, and even defending themselves from physical attacks. Moreover, no organizations independent of communist tutelage had the legal right to nominate candidates.(119) Urban and his colleagues also point out that the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) could not be considered a real legislative body because it had no budgeting ("power of the purse") or lawmaking powers; all power resided in the CPSU and its executive agencies. Without a free market in the USSR there could be no genuine legislature. Moreover, given the barriers confronting the informals, most of the deputies elected to the CPD in 1989 were party apparatchiks. Ultimately the deputies owed their appointments to the Communist party, not to any constitutents in their home districts. On the positive side, however, the 1989 elections and the CPD sessions--televised live--played a vital role in mass politicization. Chapters seven, eight, and nine deal with the elections of 1990 and the formation of political parties at the close of the Soviet period. These elections, more meaningful than those the previous year, transformed the organizational dimension of Russian politics, remaking the internal constitution of the three principal forces then present on the political field (the CPSU, nationalists and neo-Stalinists, and democrats.) These political forces grew even stronger after the constitutional ban on political parties was lifted (March 1990), and the Law on the Press was passed, abolishing censorship (June 1990). Unfortunately, since the authorities had not removed the prohibition on parties until after the 1990 elections, "all the new parties were latecomers, arriving on the scene only after the ball had ended." (p. 201) With neither identifiable constituencies to represent nor upcoming elections to prepare for, the development of Russia's political parties was ingrown. The final chapters discuss the growth of "restoration" forces, which were determined to protect the CPSU against Russian nationalists, the "war of laws," and the failed coup d'etat of August 1991. Urban and his colleagues also observe Yeltsin's autocratic behavior after the failed coup and his missed opportunities which greatly hindered his economic reform program and impeded the growth of strong democratic parties. The October 1993 skirmish between the executive and legislative branches resulted from Yeltsin's failure to call for new elections immediately after the coup. In addition, the fractiousness of the democratic parties and groups in Russia today stem from Yeltsin's reluctance to support them. In 1990 Yeltsin suspended his membership in DemRossiya (a large amorphous bloc of democratic groups), following his election to the post of chairperson of Russia's Supreme Soviet. To make matters worse, in April, 1991--when DemRossiya was mounting protests and political strikes nationwide in hope of bringing down the communist order there and then--Yeltsin "pulled the rug from under DemRossiya by cutting a deal with Gorbachev" that commenced negotiations with eight other republics (the nine-plus-one process) to rescue the federal union and restore civil peace. (p.242) Thus Yeltsin has exhibited a tendency to detach himself from his supporters as soon as his immediate objectives had been reached. Urban and his colleague claim that Yeltsin's avoidance of responsibility to his base, along with the latter's reluctance to demand it, can be counted as a major missed opportunity to provide structure to Russian political society. It directly contributed to DemRossiya's disintegration, to the power struggle between the executive and legislature in communism's aftermath, and to the fall of the first Russian republic. In short this is an excellent book for anyone who wishes to understand the growth of Russian political society in the 1989-1997 period.

Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC USA

On October 16, 1997 at a forum at Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University in Houston, Mikhail Gorbachev received the Enron Prize for Public Service. Former secretary of State James Baker credited Gorbachev for "setting the USSR on the irreversible path to freedom." Because of Gorbachev's "tremendous political courage," Baker claimed, millions of people enjoyed freer, more prosperous lives. But millions of Russians do not approve of what Gorbachev did, would deny him the Enron and Nobel Prizes, and mark him a villain because he caused the unravelling of the USSR and Warsaw Pact and because their lives are less prosperous in today's Russia. Mary Buckley's Redefining Russian Society and Polity helps the Western reader to understand the Gorbachev paradox by showing the Russian people's mixed reactions to glasnost. Her study is a key contribution to the growing body of literature about social changes in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1992. She examines the manner in which Russian journalists, academics, and political actors approached social and political issues from the Gorbachev era to the chaotic post-Soviet period. Utilizing Russian newspapers, journals, radio and television programs, interviews, and other sources, Buckley persuasively argues that the images and ideas that blossomed during the Gorbachev years led to social and political visions that were incongruent with the prevailing system. These images eventually led to systemic disintegration. Buckley states, furthermore, that Soviet citizens initially welcomed the expanded coverage of material that had long been taboo, but as they suffered from the "failed economic reforms," they began to fear "deviance and social collapse." In other words, glasnost's candor about the various social "ills" (drug abuse, prostitution, AIDS epidemic, etc.), coupled with economic uncertainty, increased the citizens' fear about Russia's future. Later, in early 1991 and 1992 under Yeltsin's leadership, soaring inflation and unemployment rates caused panic over economic security and dread of imminent civil war or revolution. The Commonwealth of Independent States, Buckley further claims, has inherited the sociopolitical diversity and the deeply rooted problems so long buried by the communist regime. Her book employs a refreshing methodology. Rather than focusing exclusively on objective events, laws, parties, and movements, as do many, if not most, monographs on the former Soviet Union, Buckley also incorporates the "emotions, myths, analogies, and jokes" prevalent in the USSR from 1985 to 1991 to better grasp Russian social and political thought in the initial years of transition. Her book is enjoyable, in part because it is full of amusing jokes that capture the mood of the Russian people. Buckley helps the reader to understand the ironies of glasnost and perestroika. First, she reminds us that Gorbachev himself did not intend for his policies of glasnost and perestroika to go as far as they did. They were supposed to have limits; Soviet citizens were not to attack Lenin the founder or the socialist system itself. Gorbachev has become a hero in the West more or less by accident. Buckley points out that Gorbachev actually came to see glasnost as "disruptive" of perestroika. If one were to juxtapose his initial intentions for glasnost with their actual results, one might conclude that the policy ultimately failed. If the purpose of glasnost was to invigorate and improve the existing Soviet socialist system, then glasnost failed because it led to the utter collapse of that system. A second, related irony is that although Gorbachev initially intended to institute purely economic reforms, he realized that economic transformations required concurrent political reforms, hence glasnost. So he encouraged "openness" as a way to stimulate creative ideas and solutions "from below." He realized that granting more decision making power to local enterprise managers would decentralize political and economic decision making powers. In a command economy a Moscow planner cannot possibly make well-informed accurate decisions for local enterprises in the various oblasts and raions. However, without a willingness to change the essential hierarchical command structure, this partial "bottom-up" approach was doomed to fail. A third irony, in this writer's opinion, is that glasnost was the catalyst that led to the putsch attempt of August 1991 which triggered the collapse of the USSR. Public anxiety about increased crime and other social problems enabled communist hardliners to demand more law and order and less individual freedom. One can argue that people in an atmosphere of danger are generally willing to sacrifice personal freedom in return for more security. Gorbachev, as his popularity ratings fell in 1990-1991, moved just right of center and appointed conservative men--like prime minister Valentin Pavlov--who attempted to launch a coup in August 1991. In the wake of the coup, on August 23, Gorbachev declared his commitment to the socialist system. He had not intended for events to lead to the rejection of the Communist Party itself. A fourth irony is that Gorbachev failed to realize that in allowing more openness, he was giving Russian public opinion a role in policymaking. This can both help or hinder the leadership. As Buckley perceptively notes, glasnost can "be used to serve political ends and construct self-interested images" (as Gorbachev intended) "as well as impart unbiased information or provide more honest reporting." Gorbachev failed to anticipate the negative repercussions of glasnost. With the liberalization of Soviet society comes freedom to criticize even the Communist leadership itself. The end result was often exaggeration, which created undue alarm. What was especially needed in order for glasnost and perestroika to work was patience and an acceptance of disorder. As Stalin once said tritely, one cannot make an omelette without breaking a few eggs. The difference is that Stalin did not have to worry about a public outcry, and Gorbachev's policy of glasnost ensured that there would be an outcry. A fifth irony is that forces of separatism and irredentism came to overshadow glasnost. Glasnost enabled non-Russian nationalities to express themselves openly and to mobilize. As a result, center-republic relations deteriorated rapidly, especially after the August 1991 coup attempt, leading ultimately to the political collapse of the very state glasnost was intended to improve. Buckley raises a point often ignored by contemporary observers: that one must discriminate among the different phases of glasnost, and the different topics for subjects involved. "The way in which glasnost was applied was not smooth, unilinear, homogenous across topics, nor was glasnost without boundaries." She points out, for example, that, whereas in 1985, drugs, crime, prostitution, and suicide were generally not mentioned at all in the press, by 1987, these were common topics of news stories. The first phase of glasnost, then, from 1986-1987, involved the uncovering of these social problems. Some, such as child abuse and AIDS, were more controversial and sensitive than others, and thus disclosed later. Social problems were exposed first because they were still "safer" to reveal than issues of democratic reform, decentralization, ethnic/nationalist issues, and past military interventions. Topics that would lead directly to the unravelling of Gorbachev's authority and the authority of the Communist party as a whole were taboo. Articles about past Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe, for example, specifically official Soviet apologies, did not appear in the papers until much later, toward the end of Gorbachev's incumbency. To some degree, one should not blame Gorbachev. Glasnost was a rational idea. New ideas needed to percolate up from the grassroots, to eliminate the stagnation of the Brezhnev era and energize the system by accelerating productivity. Glasnost simply did not fit the Russian polity. To understand in depth why glasnost and perestroika led to the collapse of the USSR, one must--as Buckley's book implies--understand Russian culture and history. Discussion of social problems during the Soviet period were still very controversial. According to the official ideology of the Soviet communist party, there were no social ills. People were portrayed as ecstatic to live in the Soviet Union and have the opportunity to participate in building socialism. Ordinary Soviet citizens who viewed the world through the prism of Soviet propaganda, were shocked to learn the true statistics about drug addiction, prostitution, and suicide in their country and suffered from lack of perspective. The crime rate, for example, might have increased in comparison to the earlier Soviet period, but in comparison to major U.S. cities, it was still low. However, the stark contrast between a dearth of inf

Gaspar Francia defined himself as a Jacobine, and he was one, in a country so far removed from european cultural currents, and from the conditions that led to the french revolution, he managed to create an exceptionally interesting economical and political experiment. A centralized state, that owned most of the lands, and guaranteed to its people, at the beginning of the XIX century, basic education for all, efficient agriculture, the start of an industrial development, a professional army, and total independence from the powers of the time. He certainly was a dictator, with total and absolute authority. But was feared only by the higher classes, and loved by the people. His "reign" was peaceful, in sharp contrast with the blood shed in internecine wars in neighboring countries, and the executions of his enemies where rare. Rengger is one of the few witnesses to the first period of his government (1819 to 1825, Francia was in power from 1813 to 1840)and because of this, very important. The author is at the other end of the polytical spectrum, extremely critical of Francia's endeavours and actions, his friends are those that oppose Francia, and he despises the common folk that support him. The book should be read taking this into account, but is very well written and very informative.

In this book, Turnbull explores the options for Australian Republicanism and draws a compelling portrait of the political and historical imperative for an Australian republic. The determination and Passion that Turnbull has for his country having its own head of state shines through in this book. To those who voted Yes in the failed republican referendum, this is your handbook to keep up the fight. Fot those who voted NO, get this book to dispell the lies you were told during the campain. Viva Republic!